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1 Introduction
In the recent macroeconomic literature the paradigm of the forward looking, representative,
agent is contaminated by rule of thumbconsumers. Agents who cannot use nancial mar-
kets to smooth consumption over time, but consume their available labor income in each
period, stand next to standard forward looking agents. This framework was originally devel-
oped by Mankiw (2000) to account for the empirical relationship between consumption and
disposable income, which seems stronger than suggested by the permanent income hypothe-
sis.
Galì, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004 and 2005; GLV (2004) and GLV (2005) henceforth),
Bilbiie (2005) and Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2005) show that considering rule of thumb,
or non ricardian, consumers within the New Keynesian framework leads to substantially
di¤erent predictions from those delivered by a standard model.1
In this paper we generalize the New Keynesian framework with capital accumulation
and rule of thumb consumers, as developed by GLV (2004) and GLV (2005), to allow for
nominal wage stickiness a là Calvo. Our key ndings are that wage stickiness: i) alters the
determinacy conditions of simple interest rate rules; ii) modify the impulse response function
of the model economy after a government spending shock.
GLV (2004) study determinacy properties of interest rate rules in a sticky-price economy
with a fraction of rule of thumb consumers and capital accumulation. The same issue is
considered by Bilbiie (2005) and Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2005) who provide an analytical
treatment, but neglect capital accumulation. The general conclusion of these papers is that
1The simple heterogeneity between households we have described, breaks the Ricardian Equivalence. For
this reason rule of thumb consumers are also dened as non ricardian consumers and it what follows we will
use the two denitions interchangeably. This terminology is due to Galì et al (2004). Simmetrically standard
forward looking households are dened as ricardian households.
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the Taylor principle may fail to guarantee a unique rational expectation equilibrium in the
presence of non ricardian agents. In particular Bilbiie (2005) shows that when the importance
of rule of thumb consumers in the economy is larger than a certain threshold, the determinacy
of the rational expectation equilibrium is, in general, guaranteed by a so called Inverted Taylor
principle. In this case the interest rate rule adopted by the central bank should be such to
engineer a decrease in the real interest rate in response to positive variations in the, current
or expected, ination rate.
We nd that even a mild degree of wage stickiness restores the Taylor principle as a nec-
essary condition for equilibrium determinacy. Our analysis provides theoretical foundations
to the results in Erceg et al (2005) who consider a New Keynesian model with rule of thumb
consumers and sticky wages, but nd no evidence of a failure of the Taylor principle.
Turning to the e¤ect of scal shocks, GLV (2005) argue that rule of thumb consumers
constitute a potential solution to the so called Government Spending Puzzle. Fatas and
Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use the VAR methodology to document
that an innovation in government spending causes a persistent rise in private consumption.
Nevertheless standard DSGE models predict that a positive shock to government purchases
will have a contractionary e¤ect on consumption.2 The literature has identied this sharp
contrast between the implications of the theory on one hand, and empirical results on the
other, as a puzzle. GLV (2005) show that the interaction between rule of thumb consumers,
sticky prices and decit nancing delivers a positive response of aggregate consumption to
an innovation in government spending. However, in their model the crowding in of aggregate
consumption is obtained through a strong response of the real wage to the scal shock which
boosts consumption of non ricardian agents. Such a sharp increase in the real wage is at
2 In a nutshell, the reason is that an increase in government spending generates a negative wealth e¤ect
which induces forward looking households to consume less and to work more.
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odds with the evidence. Burnside et al (2004) estimate a negative response of the real wage
to a spending innovation, while Blanchard and Perotti and Fatas and Mihov (2002) identify
a positive but limited response.
We nd that nominal wage stickiness prevents the large increase in the real wage in the
aftermath of a government spending shock which a¤ected the GLVs model. For empiri-
cally plausible values of parameters, the positive response of aggregate consumption to an
innovation in government spending vanishes.
Government purchase shocks are coupled with a raise in aggregate consumption when
agents su¤er a low cost of supplying labor in terms of utility. In such a case the increase
in hours worked due to the government spending shock is enough to boost consumption of
ricardian agents, and to compensate for the negative wealth e¤ect, exerted by the shock, on
consumption of ricardian agents.
Results are robust to various specications of the Taylor rule used in the literature,
including one which reacts to wage ination.
The remainder of the paper is laid as follows. Section 2 and 3 outline the model and its
log-linearized version. Section 4 contains the main results. Section 5 veries the robustness
of the results to alternative interest rate rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. As in GLV (2004) and GLV (2005),
households in the interval [0; ] cannot access nancial markets and do not have an initial
capital endowment. The behavior of these agents is characterized by a simple rule of thumb:
they consume their available labor income in each period. The rest of the households on the
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interval (; 1] is composed by standard ricardian households who have access to the market
for physical capital and to a full set of state contingent securities. Ricardian households
hold a common initial capital endowment. The period utility function is common across
households and it has the following separable form
Ut = u [Ct (i)]  v [Lt (i)] (1)
where Ct(i) is agent is consumption and Lt(i) are labor hours.3
We assume a continuum of di¤erentiated labor inputs indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. As in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004a), agent i supplies all labor inputs. Wage-setting decisions are taken
by labor type-specic unions indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Given the wage W jt xed by union j,
agents stand ready to supply as many hours on labor market j, Ljt , as required by rms, that
is
Ljt =
 
W jt
Wt
! w
Ldt (2)
where w is the elasticity of substitution between labor inputs. Here Ldt is aggregate labor
demand and Wt is an index of the wages prevailing in the economy at time t. Formal den-
itions of labor demand and of the wage index can be found in the section devoted to rms.
Agents are distributed uniformly across unions, hence aggregate demand of labor type j is
spreaded uniformly between all households.4 It follows that the individual quantity of hours
worked, Lt (i), is common across households and we will denote it with Lt. This must satisfy
the time resource constraint Lt =
R 1
0
Ljtdj. Combining the latter with (2) we obtain
Lt = L
d
t
Z 1
0
 
W jt
Wt
! w
dj (3)
The labor market structure allows to rule out di¤erences in labor income between households
3The function u is incresing and concave while the function v is increasing and convex.
4Thus a share  of the associates of the unions are non ricardian consumers, while the remaining share is
composed by non ricardian agents.
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without the need to resort to contingent markets for hours. The common labor income is
given by Ldt
R 1
0
W jt

W jt
Wt
 w
dj.5
2.1.1 Ricardian households.
Ricardian Householdstime t nominal ow budget reads as
Pt (C
o
t + I
o
t ) + (1 +Rt)
 1
Bot + Ett;t+1Xt+1 (4)
 Xt + Ldt
Z 1
0
W jt
 
W jt
Wt
! w
dj +RktK
o
t 1 +B
o
t 1 + PtD
o
t   PtT ot
Ricardian agents have access to a full set of state contingent assets. More precisely, in
each time period t, consumers can purchase any desired state-contingent nominal payment
Xt+1 in period t+1 at the dollar cost Ett;t+1Xt+1. t;t+1 denotes a stochastic discount
factor between period t+ 1 and t. Ldt
R 1
0
W jt

W jt
Wt
 w
dj denotes labor income and RktK
o
t 1
is capital income obtained from renting the capital stock to rms at the nominal rental
rate Rkt . PtD
o
t are dividends due from the ownership of rms, while B
o
t is the quantity of
nominally riskless bonds purchased in period t at the price (1 +Rt)
 1and paying one unit
of the consumption numeraire in period t+1. PtT ot represent nominal lump sum taxes. As
in GLV, the households stock of physical capital evolves according to:
Kot = (1  )Kot 1 + 

Iot
Kot 1

Kot 1 (5)
5Erceg et al (2000), assume, as in most of the literature on sticky wages, that each agent is the monopolistic
supplier of a single labor input. In this case, assuming that agents are spreaded uniformly across unions allows
to rule out di¤erences in income between households providing the same labor input (no matter whether
they are ricardian or not), but it does not allow to rule out di¤erence in labor income between non ricardian
agents that provide di¤erent labor inputs. This would amount to have an economy populated by an innity of
di¤erent individuals, since non ricardian agents cannot share the risk associated to labor income uctuations.
Although this framework would be of interest, it would imply a tractability problem.
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where  denotes the physical rate of depreciation. Capital adjustment costs are introduced
through the term 

Iot
Kot 1

Kot 1, which determines the change in the capital stock induced
by investment spending Iot . The function  satises the following properties: 
0 () > 0,

00
()  0, 0 () = 1,  () = : Thus, adjustment costs are proportional to the rate of
investment per unit of installed capital. Ricardian households face the, usual, problem of
maximizing the expected discounted sum of istantaneous utility subject to constraints (4) and
(5). Let t and Qt denote the Lagrange multipliers on the rst and on the second constraint
respectively. The rst order conditions with respect to Cot , I
o
t , B
o
t , K
o
t , Xt+1 are
uc (C
o
t ) = tPt (6)
1
0

Iot
Kot 1
 = qt (7)
1
(1 +Rt)
= Et
t+1
t
(8)
Qt = Et

t;t+1

Rkt+1 +Qt+1

(1  )  0

Iot+1
Kot

Iot+1
Kot
+ 

Iot+1
Kot

(9)
t;t+1 = 
t+1
t
(10)
where  = 11+ represents the discount factor,  is the time preference rate and qt =
Qt
Pt
is the
real shadow value of installed capital, i.e. Tobins Q. Substituting (6) into (10) we obtain the
denition of the stochastic discount factor t;t+1 = 
uc(Cot+1)
Pt+1
Pt
uc(Cot )
while combining (10)
and (8) we recover the following arbitrage condition on the asset market
Ett;t+1 = (1 +Rt)
 1
2.1.2 Non ricardian households.
Non ricardian agents do not hold physical capital neither enjoy rmsprots in the form
of dividend income. The nominal budget constraint of a typical non ricardian household is
given by
7
PtC
rt
t = L
d
t
Z 1
0
W jt
 
W jt
Wt
! w
dj   PtT rtt (11)
Agents belonging to this class are forced to consume available income in each period and
delegate wage decisions to unions. For these reasons there are no rst order conditions with
respect to consumption and labor supply. Similarly to GLV (2005) we let lump sum taxes
(transfers) paid (received) by non ricardian households di¤er by those paid by ricardian.
2.2 Wage Setting
Nominal wage rigidities are modeled according to the Calvo (1983) mechanism. In each
period a union faces a constant probability 1   w of being able to reoptimize the nominal
wage. We extend the analysis in GVL (2005) and assume that the nominal wage newly reset
at t, fWt, is chosen to maximize a weighted average of agentslifetime utilities. The weights
attached to the utilities of ricardian and non ricardian agents are (1  ) and , respectively.
The union problem is
maxfWt Et
1X
s=0
(w)
s 
(1  )u  Cot+s+ u  Crtt+s  v (Lt+s)	
subject to (3), (4), and (11).6 The FOC with respect to fWt is
Et
1X
s=0
(w)
t+s
t;t+s
(

1
MRSrtt+s
+ (1  ) 1
MRSot+s
 fWt
Pt+s
  w
)
= 0 (12)
where t;t+s = vL (Lt+s)Ldt+sW
w
t and 
w = w(w 1) is the, constant, wage mark-up in
the case of wage exibility. MRSrtt+s and MRS
o
t+s are the marginal rates of substitution
between labor and consumption of non ricardian and ricardian agents respectively. Notice
6Many reasons have been provided to justify the presence of non ricardian consumers. A few of them are
miopia, fear of saving and transaction costs on nancial markets. None of these is, however, in contrast with
rule of thumb consumers delegating wage decision to a forward looking agency, in this case a trade union.
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that when wages are exible (12) reduces to
Wt
Pt
= w


1
MRSrtt
+ (1  ) 1
MRSot
 1
(13)
which is identical to the wage setting equation in GLV (2005).
2.3 Firms
In each period t a nal good Yt is produced by a perfectly competitive rm, combining a
continuum of intermediate inputs Yt (z), according to the following standard CES production
function:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(z)
p 1
p dz
 p
p 1
with p > 1 (14)
The producer of the nal good takes prices as given and chooses the quantities of intermediate
goods by maximizing its prots. This leads to the demand of intermediate good z and to the
price of the nal good which are respectively
Yt(z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 p
Yt ; Pt =
hR 1
0
Pt(z)
1 pdz
i 1
1 p
Intermediate inputs Yt(z) are produced by a continuum of size one of monopolistic rms
which share the following technology:
Yt (z) = [Kt 1 (z)]

[Lt (z)]
1 
where 0 <  < 1 is the share of income which goes to capital in the long run, Kt 1 (z) is
the time t capital service hired by rm z, while Lt (z) is rm zs demand of the labor input.
The latter is dened as Lt (z) =
R 1
0

Ljt (z)
 w 1
w
dj
 w
w 1
with w > 1. Firms z demand
for labor type j and the aggregate wage index are respectively
Ljt (z) =

W jt
Wt
 w
Ldt (z) ; Wt =
R 1
0

W jt
1 w
dj
1=(1 w)
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where Ldt (z) are units of labor bundle demand by rm z. The nominal marginal cost is
given by
MCt =

1


1
(1  )
1 
W 1 t
 
Rkt

Price setting. We assume rms set prices according to the same mechanism assumed for
wage setting. Firms in each period have a chance 1   p to reoptimize their price. A price
setter z takes into account that the choice of its time t nominal price, ePt, might a¤ect not
only current but also future prots. The rst order condition for price setting is:
Et
1X
s=0
 
p
s
t+sP
p
t+sYt+s
h ePt   pMCt+si = 0 (15)
which can be given the usual interpretation.7 Notice that p = pp 1 represents the markup
over the price which would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities.
2.4 Government
The Government nominal ow budget constraint is
PtTt + (1 +Rt)
 1
Bt = Bt 1 + PtGt (16)
where PtGt is nominal government expenditure on the nal good. We assume a scal rule of
the form
tt = bbt 1 + ggt (17)
where tt = Tt TY , gt =
Gt G
Y and bt =
Bt
Pt
 Bt 1Pt 1
Y . gt is assumed to follow a rst order
autoregressive process gt = ggt 1 + "
g
t where 0  g  1 and "gt is a normally distributed
7Recall that t is the value of an additional dollar for a ricardian household. It is the lagrange multiplier
on ricardian househols nominal ow budget constraint.
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zero-mean random shock to government spending.8
2.5 Monetary Policy
An interest rate-setting rule is required for the dynamic of the model to be fully specied.
Our baseline parameterization features the central bank setting the nominal interest rate as
a function of current ination according to the following log-linear rule
rt = t (18)
where rt = log
(1+Rt)
1+ and t = log
Pt
Pt 1
. In standard sticky prices models without capital
accumulation, as in Woodford (2003) or Galì (2002), rule (18) ensures local uniqueness of the
rational expectation equilibrium if it satises the Taylor Principle, i.e. if  > 1. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2005) show that when the central bank follows a contemporaneous rule the
determinacy conditions are, in general, not altered by capital accumulation.
2.6 Aggregation
We denote aggregate consumption, lump sum taxes, capital, investment, dividends and bonds
with Ct, Tt, Kt, It, Dt and Bt, respectively. These are dened as
Ct = C
rt
t + (1  )Cot ; Dt = (1  )Dot It = (1  ) Iot ;
Tt = T
rt
t + (1  )T ot ; Kt = (1  )Kot ; Bt = (1  )Bot :
8A su¢ cient condition for non explosive debt dynamics is
(1 + ) (1  b) < 1
which is satised if
b >

1 + 
We assume this condition is satised throughout.
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2.7 Market Clearing
The clearing of good and labor markets requires
Yt(z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 p
Y dt 8z Y dt = Yt;
Ljt =

W jt
Wt
 w
Ldt 8j Lt =
R 1
0
Ljtdj
where Y dt = Ct + Gt + It represents aggregate demand, L
j
t =
R 1
0
Ljt (z) dz is the demand of
labor input j and Ldt =
R 1
0
Lt (z) dz denotes rmsaggregate demand of the composite labor
input. The clearing condition of the market for physical capital reads as
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kt (z) dz
2.8 Steady State
As in GLV, steady state lump sum taxes are such that steady state consumption levels are
equalized across agents. Variables without time subscript denote steady state values. Firm
is cost minimization implies
W
P
=
(1  )
p
Y
L
; rk =

p
Y
K
where
K
Y
=

p (+ )
Since the ratio GY = g is, by assumption, exogenous, we can determine the steady state
share of consumption on output, c, as follows
c = 1 

p (+ )
  g
which, as noticed by GLV, is independent of . In what follows it will prove useful to know
W
P
L
C , which equals
W
P
L
C
=
(1  )
p
Y
L
L
C
=
(1  )
pc
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3 The Log-linearized model.
To make our results readily comparable to those in Bilbiie (2005) and GLV (2005) we adopt
the same period utility function considered in their works:
u (Ct) = logCt ; v (Lt) =
L1+t
1+
which features a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and a con-
stant elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor vLL = .9 In what follows lower case letters
denote log-deviations from the steady state values. The log-deviation of the real wage, de-
noted by wt, constitutes the only exception to this rule. The conditions which dene the
log-linear approximation to equations of the model are derived in GLV (2005) and we report
them in the appendix. We provide, instead, a detailed derivation of the wage ination curve
and of the real wage schedule.
3.1 Wage ination, the real wage schedule and the e¤ect of economic
activity on the real wage.
In the case of identical steady state consumption levels, agents have a common steady state
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. This implies that equation
(12) can be given the following log-linear approximation
Et
1X
s=0
(w)
t+s 
wt+s  mrsAt+s

= 0
where mrsAt = mrs
rt
t +(1  )mrsot is a weighted average of the log-deviations between the
marginal rates of substitution of the two agents. In what follows we will refer to mrsAt as to
9The selected period utility belongs to the King-Plosser-Rebelo class and leads to constant steady state
hours.
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the average marginal rate of substitution. Given the selected functional forms, the (log)wage
optimally chosen at time t is dened as
logfWt = logw + (1  w)Et 1X
s=0
(w)
t+s flogPt+s + logCt +  logLtg
Combining the latter with the following, standard, log-linear approximation of the wage index
logWt = (1  w) logfWt + w logWt 1
we obtain the desired wage ination curve
wt = Et
w
t+1   wwt (19)
where w =
(1 w)(1 w)
w
and wt = (logWt   logPt)   (logw + logCt +  logLt) is the
wage mark-up that unions impose over the average marginal rate of substitution.10 Notice
that since unions maximize a weighted average of agentsutilities, the wage ination curve
takes a standard form. Equation (19) allows to obtain the log-deviation of time t real wage,
which plays a prominent role in the determination of non ricardian agents consumption, as
follows
wt =   [wt 1 +  (Etwt+1 + Ett+1)  t] +  w (lt + ct) (20)
where   = w
(1+2w)
.   determines both the degree of forward and backward lookingness.11
Todays average real wage is a function of its lagged and expected value, expected and current
ination. The term ldt + ct represents the average real wage that would prevail in the case
of wage exibility.
10As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), the coe¢ cient w is di¤erent form that in Erceg et
al (2000), which is the standard reference for the analysis of nominal wage stickiness.The reason is that we
have assumed that agents provide all labor inputs. In the more standard case in which each individual is the
monopolistic supplier of a given labor input, w would be equal to
(1 w)(1 w)
w(1+w)
hence lower than in the
case we consider.
11The e¤ect of discounting on the forward looking component is quantitatively negligible.
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Substituting (29) into (20) we obtain:
wt =  wt 1 +   (Etwt+1 + Ett+1) + 	yt  	kt 1 +  wct    t (21)
where 	 =   w(1 ) determines the e¤ect on the real wage due to changes in the level of real
activity.
Comparative statics. @ @w > 0: a longer average duration of wage contracts does not have
a clear cut e¤ect on real wage inertia. As w gets larger both forward and backward
lookingness increase. @	@ > 0: the more elastic is the marginal disutility of labor, i.e.
the higher is , the higher is the sensitivity of wages to an increase in economic activity.
@	
@w
< 0: the higher is average duration of wage contracts, i.e. the higher is w, the
lower is the sensitivity of wages to an increase in economic activity. The same can be
said for what concerns the sensitivity of the real wage to hours.
Intuition goes as follows. A higher w implies that the nominal wage will be newly reset
on a limited number of labor markets, thus the previous period average wage has a stronger
inuence on todays. At the same time those unions which optimally reset their wage will
attach a higher weight on expected future variables.
The parameter 	 determines the size of the variation in real wage associated with a
given variation in real economic activity. This is jointly determined by the probability that
wages cannot be changed in a given period, w, and the elasticity of the marginal disutility
of labor, . Woodford and Rotemberg (1997) report evidence suggesting that the output
elasticity of real wage is in a neighborhood of 0.3. Figure 1 plots 	 as a function of  for
alternative degrees of wage stickiness assuming the values  = 0:99 and  = 13 . Empirical
estimates suggest that wages have an average duration of an year (w = 0:75). In this case,
a value of 	 consistent with the estimates in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) is obtained
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by setting  close to 5. In a model with a frictionless labor market this would lead to an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply equal to 0:2, which is in line with the
micro-evidence in Card (1991) and Pencavel (1986). Thus, we obtain a output sensitivity of
real wage consistent with the estimates using empirically plausible values of  and w.
This is not the case under wage exibility. When w = 0 equation (21) reduces to
wt =

(1  )yt  

(1  )kt 1 + ct
which is the wage setting equation in GLV (2005). In order to be consistent with the
afore-mentioned evidence on the output elasticity of real wage GLV (2005) set  equal to 0.2.
This value is, however, far from consistent with the microeconomic evidence on the elasticity
of labor supply and from standard calibration of preferences.
4 Results
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the parameters of the model since the analysis of equilibrium determinacy and
equilibrium dynamics that follow draws on numerical results. The time unit is meant to be a
quarter. In the baseline parametrization we set w = 0:75, which implies an average duration
of wage contracts of one year as suggested by the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Levine et al (2005).  and  assume the standard values of 13 and 0:99 respectively. Table 1
reports the output sensitivity of real wage 	 as a function of . In column 2 we consider the
baseline calibration for wage stickiness, while in column 4 we evaluate 	 under the limiting
case of wage exibility. Table 1 shows that, under the baseline calibration for wage stickiness,
setting  = 4:84 allows to match the output elasticity of real wage reported by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), thus we take this value as the baseline. However, to evaluate the
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dependence of the models implications on the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor,
we consider two other values of  beside the baseline. The rst,  = 0:2, corresponds to the
value employed by GLV (2005), the second  = 3 is chosen because commonly employed in the
literature. Table 1, consistently with the discussion in the previous section, points out that
when standard values are assigned to , the exible wage scenario leads to extremely high
output sensitivity of real wage. The baseline value for the share of non ricardian consumers,
, is 0.5. This is consistent with the estimates in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Muscatelli
et al (2003). Remaining parameters are displayed in Table 2, and the reader can refer to the
references reported in GLV (2005) for empirical evidence supporting them. However, it is
worth mentioning that in the baseline calibration  is set to 1:5. Thus monetary policy is
assumed to satisfy the standard Taylor Principle.
Table 1: Output sensitivity of real wage as a function of the elasticity of labor disutility and
the calvo parameter on wages.
	 	
=0.2; w=0.75 0.011 =0.2; w=0 0.3
=3; w=0.75 0.116 =1; w=0 4. 5
=4.84; w=0.75 0.300 =4.84; w=0 7. 26
4.2 Determinacy
Figure 2 depicts indeterminacy areas in the parameter space (; ). Other parameters are
set at their baseline values. A rst result is visually evident:
Result 1. Determinacy and the Taylor Principle. The Taylor Principle is a neces-
sary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium determinacy.
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To develop intuition behind this result, we build on the economic mechanism emphasized
by Bilbiie (2005). To isolate the e¤ect of wage stickiness on determinacy conditions it is
initially convenient to assume that wages are exible.
Suppose that the level of ination starts increasing without any change in fundamentals
that could justify it. To the extent that the central bank follows the Taylor Principle, the real
interest rate increases in the aftermath of the rise in ination. This has a contractionary e¤ect
on consumption of ricardian agents. Due to lower demand, some rms x a lower price, while,
rms which are prevented from doing it, reduce labor demand, putting a downward pressure
on the real wage. As a result real marginal costs decrease and there is an increase in prots.12
The latter implies a positive wealth e¤ect on consumption of ricardian consumers, who own
rms and enjoy prots in the form of dividend income. Notice that, due to aggregation,
a one unit increase in prots leads to a 11  increase in individual dividend income. As a
consequence, when the share of rule of thumb consumers is above a given threshold, the
wealth e¤ect stemming from a prots increase may lead to a rise in aggregate demand.13
If this is the case, the sunspot in ination could become self-fullling through the positive
relationship between output and ination implied by the NKPC. As pointed out by Bilbiie
(2005) an interest rate rule satised the Inverted Taylor Principle, would lead to a fall in
prots, making the initial increase in ination non compatible with a rational expectation
equilibrium.
How does wage stickiness alter the adjustment process described above?
The key point is that wage stickiness dampens variation in the real wage associated to
changes in hours. Thus, for a given reduction of labor demand, real marginal costs do not
12The increse in prots becomes stronger as the marginal elasticity of labor disutility, , increases. In this
case small variations in hours are accompanied by large variations in the real wage.
13As emphasized by Bilbiie (2005) when all agents hold assests this mechanism is irrelevant. The e¤ect of
the increse in prots on agentsincome is exactly o¤set by the decrease in real wage.
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decrease as they would if wages were exible. In this case the wealth e¤ect produced by
the increase in prots does not o¤set the substitution e¤ect exerted on demand of ricardian
consumers by the initial real rate increase. This prevents the rise in demand that could
ex-post rationalize the sunspot in ination.
Similarly to GLV (2004) we nd that when strong price stickiness coexists with a large
share of non ricardian consumers the Taylor Principle, although necessary, needs to be
strenghtened to enforce a unique rational expectation equilibrium. With respect to the
process described above, the presence of extreme price stickiness may, in fact, lead to an
increase in the real wage in the aftermath of the sunspot in ination. This would boost
consumption of non ricardian consumers. Since non ricardian agentsdemand is insensitive
to changes in the interest rate, the only way in which the central bank could control aggre-
gate demand would be that of further depressing demand of ricardian agents engineering a
stronger increase in the rate of interest. However, we raise an important qualication with
respect to the analysis in GLV (2004). Namely, that the Taylor Principle remains a valid cri-
terion to avoid sunspot uctuations when the relevant parameters (w, p, ) assume values
compatible with the empirical estimates. In fact, under the baseline calibration, the Taylor
Principle is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy for values of the price stick-
iness parameter p  0:79. This threshold value corresponds to an average lifetime of price
contracts of 4.8 quarters, which is sensibly larger than that estimated in empirical works.14
Figure 3 depicts indeterminacy areas in the case of alternative degrees of wage stickiness
with respect to the baseline. In Panel a wages are perfectly exible. When the share of
non ricardian consumers is equal or above 20 percent, there are determinate equilibria which
are compatible with an ination response coe¢ cient  < 1, i.e. with the Inverted Taylor
14An analysis of the sensitivity of determinacy regions to the degree of price stickiness is reported in a
companion appendix.
19
Principle. However, when the average duration of wage contracts reaches two quarters (panel
b), the inverted Taylor Principle leads to equilibrium uniqueness just if the share of non
ricardian consumers is larger than 70 percent. Notice that the latter value is well above the
estimates of the importance of rule of thumb behavior reported above. For this reason cases
where the Inverted Taylor Principle leads to equilibrium uniqueness can be regarded as of
minor empirical relevance. Panel c shows, as expected, that our results are not altered when
the average duration of wage contracts is increased to ten quarters (w = 0:9).
In sum, our analysis shows that rule of thumb consumers do not invalidate the relevance
of the Taylor Principle when nominal wage stickiness, an uncontroversial empirical fact, is
considered.
4.3 Consumption and Government Spending Shocks.
Figure 4 depicts the response of key variables to a government spending shock.
Result 2. Impact response of aggregate consumption. When wages are sticky ag-
gregate consumption decreases in the aftermath of a, partially debt nanced, gov-
ernment spending shock.
Two forces act in the direction of reducing consumption of ricardian consumers. The rst
one is the negative wealth e¤ect determined by the government purchase shock, while the
second one is due to the positive response of the real interest rate to the shock. In fact,
although wage stickiness dampens the variations in real marginal costs, and through this
channel those of ination, the response of monetary policy is such that the real interest goes
up. To analyze the overall e¤ect on aggregate consumption, we have to take into account the
response of non ricardian agentsconsumption to the unexpected rise in Government spend-
ing. Sticky wages prevent the large increase in real wage a¤ecting the GVLs model. This,
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jointly with a less prominent rise in hours worked, implies that consumption of non ricardian
consumers does not grow as much as required to determine a positive impact response of
aggregate consumption.
In what follows we assess the sensitivity of result 2 to alternative parameterization of the
elasticity of marginal disutility of labor () and to the share of non ricardian consumers ().
In Figure 5 we evaluate the sensitivity to . Dotted lines correspond to the value chosen by
GVL (2005), dashed lines to the case  = 3, while solid lines to the baseline value.
Result 3. Impact response of aggregate consumption and . The e¤ect of a Gov-
ernment spending shock on private consumption is positive when the elasticity of mar-
ginal disutility of labor, , is low.
Consider the case where  = 0:2, which corresponds to the calibration adopted by GVL
(2005). Under this parameterization (see Table 1), wage stickiness implies an extremely low
sensitivity of the real wage to economic activity and to changes in hours. In this case the
government spending shock leads to a negligible increase in the real wage. This causes a
mild rise in real marginal costs and, thus, in ination. As a consequence, the real interest
rate grows modestly and the reduction in ricardian agentsconsumption is well below those
registered in the case where  is larger. At the same time, when  = 0:2, the strong increase
in hours brings about an increase in consumption of ricardian agents which is larger than
under the other parameterizations.
In sum, when the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor is low the impulse responses
of both agentsconsumption levels are favorable to a positive impact variation of aggregate
consumption with respect to the baseline case.
However as the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor approaches the values supported
by the empirical evidence the response of the real wage to the innovation in government
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spending gets stronger, although it remains much lower than in GVL (2005). In this case
the variation in ination is such to imply a stronger reaction of the real interest rate which
depresses consumption of ricardian consumers. Finally the joint movement of real wage and
hours dampens the change in consumption of non ricardian agents and prevents an increase
in aggregate consumption. Notice that monetary policy, plays a crucial role for this results
since it impacts on ricardian agents consumption through its e¤ect on the real interest rate.
The robustness of our results to alternative interest rate setting rules in explored below.
We conclude this section assessing the role played by the share of non ricardian consumers,
. A clear result emerges from gure 6.
Result 4. Impact response of aggregate consumption and . Aggregate consumption
shows a positive response to a government spending shock for large values of the share,
, of non ricardian consumers.
Figure 6 makes clear that aggregate consumption shows a positive, and mildly persistent,
response for values of the share on non ricardian consumers which are above the upper
interval of empirical estimates. As in GVL (2005) the e¤ect of the spending shock on output
is increasing in the share of non ricardian consumers. This implies also that the e¤ect on labor
demand and on the real wage are positive function of the importance of non ricardian agents in
the economy. The pattern of the real wage is transmitted to price ination. Since monetary
policy obeys to the Taylor Principle, the real rate grows. For this reason consumption of
ricardian consumers is lower the higher the share of non ricardian consumers. This e¤ect
partly counterbalances the increase in consumption of non ricardian agents, which is, instead,
a positive function of .
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5 Robustness to alternative interest rate rules.
In this section we discuss whether Results 1 and 2 are robust to simple variant of the Taylor
rules proposed in the literature.
We consider rules which are specialization of the, general, instrumental rule
rt = rrt 1 + Ett+i + yEtyt+i (22)
When i =  1, (22) reduces to a backward looking rule, when i = 0 it corresponds to a
contemporaneous rule and when i = 1 it becomes a forward looking rule. For each of the
specications mentioned we consider the case of inertia, with r = 0:5.
Determinacy. Figure 7 depicts indeterminacy regions for each of the specication of the
interest rate rule we consider. A key result is stated in the following.
Result 5. Determinacy and non ricardian consumers. Under most of the Taylor-type
interest rate setting rules considered in the literature, the determinacy and indetermi-
nacy regions for the model with non ricardian consumers featuring price-wage stickiness
are similar to those identied for a representative agent economy.
The forward looking rule, depicted in panel f, shows a determinacy region which is severely
restricted with respect to the case of a contemporaneous rule. As pointed out by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2005), forward looking rules increase the likelihood of sunspot uctuations in the
case of endogenous capital accumulation and should be implemented with care. Panels a,c
and e suggest that nominal interest rate inertia makes indeterminacy less likely, no matter
the rule followed by the central bank. Increasing the size of rule of thumb consumers does not
determine variations of indeterminate regions in the contemporaneous and forward looking
case. It a¤ects, instead, the backward looking case. More precisely indeterminacy regions in
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the inertial case are similar to those obtained for the non inertial case.15
Consumption and Government Spending Shocks. Figure 8 reports the response of
aggregate consumption to a government spending shock under the various specications of
the general rule (22) we have analyzed. The response of the central bank to price ination
is kept at its baseline value, while we report impulse response functions for three di¤erent
parameterizations of y. We emphasize the following.
Result 6. Aggregate consumption and monetary rules. Backward looking monetary
rules are more likely than contemporaneous and forward looking rules to deliver a pos-
itive impact response of aggregate consumption to a government spending shock. Re-
acting to deviations of output from its steady state level reduces, instead, the likelihood
of a positive impact response of consumption.
The reason for which a backward looking rule helps obtaining a positive impact response is
straightforward. Di¤erently from what happens under the contemporaneous and the forward
looking rule, when the central bank responds to lagged variables there is no positive impact
increase in the real interest rate. This favours a mild reduction in consumption of ricardian
consumers, while that of non ricardian is positively a¤ected by the increase in hours worked
and the real wage. However, as the e¤ects of the shock are transmitted to ination and
output, the positive variation in the real rate of interest drives consumption of non ricardian
agents below the steady state level and at the same time leads to a reduction in the level of
15The interested reader can nd a detailed analysis of alternative intrerest rate rules at the in a companion
appendix, where we also consider a rule which reacts to wage ination. In this case a necessary condition for
determinacy is p + w > 1, where w is the wage ination coe¢ cient response. It should not be, by now,
surprising that this is equivalent to the condition which holds in a model without non ricardian consumers
as shown by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a).
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output and hours. This negatively a¤ects consumption of non ricardian agents. These e¤ects
are mirrored in the dynamic pattern of aggregate consumption, which exhibits a positive
response on impact, but lacks of persistence. Notice that this stands in sharp contrast
with what happens if the central bank follows, for example, a contemporaneous rule, where
aggregate consumption decreases smoothly after the government spending shock (panel d).
The contemporaneous and the forward looking rule do not, instead, di¤er relevantly for what
concerns the likelihood of delivering a positive impact response of consumption, no matter
whether we consider an inertial component in interest rate setting.
Reacting to output deviation determines a less marked increase in production in the
aftermath of the shock, containing the variation in hours worked and, thus, in consumption
of non ricardian consumers.16
6 Conclusions
We regard a framework where current income a¤ects consumption possibilities as a promis-
ing step towards realism in economic modeling. In this case, however, it should be taken
into account that labor markets and the wage setting process are subject to some form of
imperfections. In an economy populated by an exogenous share of non ricardian consumers,
wage stickiness a¤ects both the response of aggregate variables to a government spending
shock and the conditions for equilibrium determinacy. Once wage stickiness is considered,
the positive e¤ect of government spending on aggregate consumption reported by the empir-
ical studies of, inter alia, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), is not a robust feature of the model
with rule of thumb consumers. In particular, it can be replicated just when the marginal
disutility of labor e¤ort is low. Contrary to Bilbiie (2005) and GLV (2004) we have shown
16The case of a central bank reacting to wage ination is detailed in the companion appendix.
25
that, for a wide set of parameter congurations, the Taylor Principle implies equilibrium
determinacy. Determinacy regions are similar to those obtained in a representative agent
model under most interest rate setting rules considered in the literature.
Our results suggest that the determinacy properties of the model with non ricardian
consumers strongly depends on the kind of nominal rigidities considered. For this reason, we
warn against reappraisals of the conduct of monetary policy in specic past periods which
are based on non ricardian consumers but neglect wage stickiness.
For what concerns the feature of welfare maximizing monetary policy, we conjecture that
the optimality of a passive monetary rule, as advocated by Bilbiie (2005) in a sticky prices-
exible wages economy, could be altered by considering a modest degree of wage stickiness.
The latter aspect is part of our ongoing research.
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Appendix
Log-linearized equilibrium conditions.
This appendix provides a log-linear approximation to the equlibrium conditions of the model
economy described in the text. For a detailed derivation see also GVL.
Under the assumed functional forms, the Euler equation for Ricardian households takes
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the log-linear form
cot   Etcot+1 =  Et (rt   t+1) (23)
Log-linearization of equations (7) and (9) leads to the dynamic of (real)Tobins Q
qt = (1   (1  ))Etrkt+1 + Etqt+1   (rt   Ett+1) (24)
and its relationship with investment:
qt = it   kt 1
Equation (11) determines the following log-linear form for consumption of non ricardian
agents
crtt =
(1  )
pc
(lt + !t)  1
c
trtt (25)
while the assumption that consumption level are equal at the steady state implies that
aggregate consumption is
ct = (1  ) cot + crtt (26)
The stock of capital evolves according to
it = kt   (1  ) kt 1 (27)
Log-linearization of the aggregate resource constraint around the steady state yields
yt = cct + gt + (1  ec) it (28)
where ec = c + g. As in shown by Woodford (2003) a log-linear approximation to the
aggregate production function is given by
yt = (1  ) ldt + kt 1 (29)
Assuming that steady state stock of debt is zero and a steady state balanced government
budget, the dynamic of debt around the steady state yields the following law of motion for
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the stock of debt
bt = (1 + ) (bt 1 + gt   tt) (30)
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is obtained through log-linearization of condition
(15) and reads as
t = pmct + Ett+1 (31)
where p =
(1 p)(1 p)
p
and mct = (1  )wt + rkt is the real marginal cost.
Equations (23) through (31), equation (21) together with the policy rules (17) and (18)
determine the equilibrium path of the economy we have outlined.
30
Tables
Table 2: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
 0.99 subjective discount factor
 0.5 share of non Ricardian consumers
 1/3 share of capital
 0.025 depreciation rate
p 0.75 Calvo parameter on prices
w 0.75 Calvo parameter on wages
p 6 implies a steady state price mark-up of 0.2
w 6 implies a steady state wage mark-up of 0.2
g 0.2 steady state share of government purchase
 1.5 Monetary policy response to 
b 0.33 debt feedback coe¢ cient
g 0.1 public expenditure feedback coe¢ cient
g 0.9 autoregressive coe¢ cient for g process
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Figure 2: Determinacy region when wages have an average duration of 4 quarters (w = 0:75).
Instability area in black.
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zation.
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Figure 8: Response of aggregate consumption to a government spending shock under alter-
native monetary policy rules. i =  1: backward looking rule; i = 0 contemporaneous rule;
i = +1 forward looking rule
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